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The Role of Ideology in Prisoners'
Rights Adjudication: Habilitative Prison
Conditions and the Eighth Amendment
JAMES

E.

ROBERTSON*

Society has a right to punish, but not to brutalize, to
deprive of liberty, but not to expose to filth and corruption;
and if it is obstinately insisted upon that government, as such,
has no obligation to correct the morals of convicts, it is, at
all events, its sacred duty not to lead them to certain ruin,
and society takes upon itself an awful responsibility, by exposing the criminal to such moral contagion that, according
to the necessary course of things he cannot escape. **
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many areas once thought to be inappropriate subjects for
adjudication have recently come within the purview of the judiciary.
Judicial involvement in policy-making has expanded dramatically,
especially during the past three decades. One area in which judicially
supported policy reform has occurred is in the conditions of prison
confinement. Prior to the 1970's, courts regularly invoked the "handsoff" doctrine, a doctrine of non-intervention in the administration
of prisons.' However, by 1970, judges could no longer reconcile the
hands-off doctrine with the shocking conditions revealed in prisoner
*
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ed. 1964).
1. The hands-off doctrine states that "[t]he courts have no function to superintend the treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary, but only to deliver from prison
those who are illegally detained there." Sarshik v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 676, 676 (5th
Cir. 1944). Three rationales supported the hands-off doctrine: 1) judges lack expertise in correctional matters; 2) judges did not possess adequate remedies for correctional deficiencies; and 3) conditions of confinement were privileges, not rights, and

thus beyond the scope of judicial review. Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due
Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REV.
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law suits.2 A decade of lower federal courts activism followed, in which
the federal judiciary brought about dramatic changes in the constitutional status of inmates.' While the United States Supreme Court
initially accepted this expansion of inmates' rights,' by the close of
the 1970's the Court returned to a position of advocating judicial
restraint in correctional adjudication.' In the current decade, the

1, 2-5 (1978). For a critique of the hands-off doctrine, see Comment, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
2. Idleness, violence, disease, overcrowding, arbitrary decision-making by
correctional staff, and a plethora of lesser shortcomings have historically plagued
the nation's jails and prisons. As Justice Powell observed, "[the history of our prisons
is in large measure a chronicle of public indifference and neglect." Saxbe v.
Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 861 n.7 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). See Greenberg
& Stender, The Prison as a Lawless Agency, 21 BUFFALo L. REV. 799 (1972);
Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV.
795 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977) (reasonably
adequate food, shelter, clothing and sanitation), rev'd in part on other grounds sub
nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th
Cir. 1977) (psychiatric care); United States v. Wyandotte County, Kansas, 480 F.2d
969 (10th Cir. 1973) (racial segregation); Sostre v.McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971) (freedom of speech); Hodges v. Klein, 421 F. Supp. 1224 (D.N.J. 1976)
(procedural due process required in administrative segregation decisions), aff'd, 562
F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974)
(freedom of religion), aff'd sub nom. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975);
Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (due process required in
disciplinary proceedings); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970)
(searches of inmate mail); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (totality
of deplorable conditions imposes cruel and unusual punishment), aff'd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971). Several commentators have chronicled lower federal court
intervention in state correctional matters. See, e.g., Fair, The Lower Federal Courts

as Constitution-Makers: The Case of Prison Conditions, 7 AM. J. Cium. L. 119 (1979);
Note, A Review of Prisoners' Rights Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 U. RICH.
L. REV. 803 (1977); Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An
Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367 (1977).

4. Between 1970 and 1977 the Supreme Court held that inmates had limited
rights in a number of realms. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due
process in parole revocation hearings); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)
(free communication); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process in prison
disciplinary hearings); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (medical care); Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (access to the courts); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (implicitly suggesting that inmates have associational rights); see also Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (constitutional
prohibition of racial segregation applies to prisons).
5. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) ("Prison administrators
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Court's prisoners' rights decisions have contracted the constitutional
6
protections accorded inmates in lower federal court decisions.
This article seeks to broaden our understanding of prisoners' rights
adjudication by exploring the role of correctional ideology in the evolution of inmates' constitutional status. The following hypothesis is profferred: that the expansion and recent contraction of prisoners' rights
represents in part the changing ideological structure of penology. This
hypothesis will be inductively tested by examining the evolving constitutional status of habilitative prison conditions, that is, conditions
that do not result in the physical, emotional, or social degeneration
of inmates. 7 Advocates of habilitation contend that while the state
is not constitutionally, obligated to rehabilitate prisoners, the eighth
amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires that
jails and prisons prevent the degeneration of their wards. Formulated
8
in activist lower federal court decisions, the concept of constitutionally
mandated habilitative prison conditions became a potent vehicle9 for
prison reform prior to 1981. That year, in Rhodes v. Chapman, the
Supreme Court expressed a correctional ideology incompatible with
habilitation as a constitutional right of inmates.
... should be accorded wide-ranging deference . . . ");Jones v. North Carolina

Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977) ("[Clourts should allow the

prison administrators the full latitude of discretion..."). Writing in 1980, one

commentator concluded that the Court had erected a "new hands-off doctrine: the
Court will not deny jurisdiction, but the negative results based on the principle of
wide-ranging deference to administrative discretion will now achieve the same result
as the previously discredited jurisdictional bar." Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in

the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal JudicialIntervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 219 (1980) (footnote omitted).

6. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983) (administrative segregation requires minimal due process procedures, even if a protectable interest is found
to exist); Jago v. Van Guren, 454 U.S. 14 (1981) (no protectable interest in early
parole release, hence no hearing required prior to denial of parole); Connecticut Bd.
of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) (prisoner with mere hope for, but
no right in commutation of his life sentence); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337
(1981) (prison overcrowding does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).

7. See generally Note, Laaman v. Helgemoe: Degeneration, Recidivism, and
the Eight Amendment, 3 VERMONT L. REv. 243 (1978) (The right against degenera-

tion is a bold expansion of the eighth amendment and may encourage judicial intrusion into the prerogatives of the executive and judicial branches of government.).
8. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977); Laaman
v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977); Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F.
Supp. 1218 (D.V.I. 1976). Each of these decisions held that the totality of prison
conditions resulted in the probable degeneration of inmates and thus imposed cruel
and unusual punishment.
9. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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II.

THE ORIGINAL EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE "MONOMANIE"
OVER THE PENITENTIARY

The eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was drafted in response to the brutal corporal punishments of
Stuart England.'" When the abortive rebellion of the Duke of
Monmouth against King James II failed, the "Bloody Assize" of 1685
followed: to be hanged, then while still alive, to be disembowelled,
beheaded, and quartered was the fate of those guilty of treason."
In seeking to prohibit such practices, the drafters of the eighth amendment acted to limit the exercise of macro-power, a form of power
that works immediate, manifest and foreseeable harm upon the body
of criminal offenders.'2
By the middle of the nineteenth century, imprisonment had
replaced corporal punishment as the principal criminal sanction."' As
Beaumont and Tocqueville observed, a certain class of reformer had
"caught the monomanie of the penitentiary system."'"
The penitentiary was intended to rehabilitate the offender through the enclosure,
segmentation, and inspection of space.'" In the prison a new form
of power was born-micro-power, a power exercised within the bodies
of offenders rather than from above them.' 6 In contrast to macropower, micro-power works latent and often unintended punishments
10. See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1966); Note, The Effectiveness of
the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 846, 846 (1961). The eighth amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not
be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11. See Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 854 (1969). See generally W. EMERSON, MONMOUTH'S
REBELLION (1951).

12. The concept of macro-power, as used in this article, is derived from the
writings of French social scientist Michel Foucault. He contends that power can take
many generic forms. One may view macro-power as a generic form of power whose
most dramatic expression is capital punishment. See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH 32-103 (1975). See generally A. SHERIDAN, MICHEL FOUCAULT (1981).
The
concept of macro-power is further discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
15-17.
13. "The substitution of imprisonment for torture and death was the most
revolutionary step in the entire history of punishment for crime." G. KILLINGER &
P. CROMWELL, PENOLOGY V (1973).
14. G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY
SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 80 (R.
Lantz ed. 1964).

15. See generally M. FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 135-230; M.

POWER/KNOWLEDGE 37-62 (1980).

FOUCAULT,

16. The concept of micro-power, which is juxtaposed to macro-power, is based
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upon the psychology of the offender. This power has found institu-

tional expression in the attributes of confinement; Gresham Sykes'
concept of "the pains of imprisonment" 7 arising from deprivations
of liberty, autonomy, goods and services, heterosexual contact, and
security can be viewed as manifestations of micro-powers.
Whereas corporal punishment gave way to the "monomanie" of
the penitentiary, the judiciary restricted the scope of the eighth amend18
ment to punishments involving "torture or a lingering death" through
19
a formalistic mode of legal reasoning. Fidelity to precedent dictated
that only the brutal corporal punishments of Stuart England should
be prohibited as cruel and unusual punishment."0 Even excessive prison
terms were not considered unconstitutional under the eighth amendment; as the Kansas Supreme Court observed, the amendment pro2
hibited "the kind of punishment, and not . . . its duration." ' In
a century that saw the substitution of incarceration for corporal punishment, the eighth amendment became impotent in the face of
upon Michel Foucault's concept of "the micro-physics of power." Foucault asserts
that a complex web of power relations exist in the prison that invest, train, and
mark the body. These powers operate on the "modern soul:"
This real, non-corporal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which
are articulated the effects of a certain type of power. . . .On this reality
reference, various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis
carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.; on it have
been built scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of
humanism.
M. FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 29-30. For an analysis of DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH
see A. SHERIDAN, supra note 12, at 113-63.
17. G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 63-83 (1958).
18. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
19. "Legal reasoning is formalistic when the mere invocation of rules and the
deduction of conclusions from them is believed sufficient for every authoritative legal
choice." R. UNGAR, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 194 (1976). Legal formalism is thus
rule-centered, asking judges to "find" rather than "discover" the law. The mode
of reasoning assumes that legal rules are of determinate scope and application. See
generally Horowitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J.LEGAL HIsT. 251 (1975);
Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 351 (1973).
20. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (Shooting as a means
of execution did not impose the terror or pain of disembowelling, burning alive,
or other practices prohibited by the eighth amendment.); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436 (1890) (Electrocution did not violate the eight amendment because it is not
"manifestly cruel" punishment, unlike crucifixion.); see also Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 389-400 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
21. State v. White, 44 Kan. 514, 519, 25 P. 33, 35 (1890), quoted in Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 405 (1910)(White, J., dissenting). As Justice White's
dissent makes clear, the Court in Weems had clearly departed from precedent in
reading a proportionality requirement into the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 398-413 (White, J., dissenting).
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micro-power:2 legal formalism dictated that the amendment check
only abuses of macro-power.
In Weems v. United States 3 the Supreme Court freed the eighth
amendment from the constraints of legal formalism. Weems, a minor
customs official in the Philippines, had been convicted by a Philippine court of falsifying a government document. He was sentenced
to a prison term of fifteen years at hard labor, to be followed by
lifetime surveillance and perpetual loss of civil rights. The Supreme
Court held that Weems' sentence amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment. Writing for the majority, Justice McKenna implicitly overruled precedent to find punishments grossly disproportionate to the
crime violative of the eighth amendment. In place of a static meaning,
he gave the amendment a dynamic, variable content:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly
true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed
to meet passing occasions. . . .The future is their care and provisions for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy
can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.2"
The Weems decision inaugurated a purposive, result-oriented
interpretation of the eighth amendment. Whereas formalistic legal
reasoning is rule centered, concerned with the institutional autonomy
of law, and more committed to procedural regularity than substantive justice, purposive legal reasoning subordinates precedent to desired
results and is more responsive to social attitudes and pressures as
sources of legal theories. 2" While legal formalism aspires to value
neutrality, its purposive counterpart overtly engages in the selection
of competing values.2 6 Future Supreme Court decisions would read
22. See T. COOLEY, A

TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH

REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION

(8th ed. 1927).
23. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).

694

24. Id. at 373. See generally Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The

ProportionalityRule, 47 FoRDHAm L. REv. 639 (1979); Comment, The Eighth Amend-

ment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems
v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783 (1975).
25. See P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 53-113
(1978).
2 6. Procedural or substantive notions of justice become important as purposive forms of legal reasoning are adopted, and they in turn give impetus
to those varieties of argument. For policy-oriented legal discourse forces
one to make explicit choices among values, and the pursuit of procedural
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purposiveness into the substantive protections of the eighth amendment by requiring punishment to further a "valid penal function. '2 7
The federal courts would thus secure a constitutional basis for determining which penal goals are legitimate and for scrutinizing the conditions under which punishment is administered.

III.

FROM REHABILITATION TO HABILITATION

The Supreme Court in Weems expressed concern that unless the
legislative power to fix prison terms was restrained by the eighth
amendment, "zeal for a purpose, either honest or sinister" might lead
to cruelty.28 Ironically, enlightened penology of the period decreed
the indeterminate sentence to be "the first condition of civilized
criminal jurisprudence;" 29 rehabilitation had gained ideological
hegemony. 3" The rehabilitative ideology called for individualized treatment of offenders and thus advocated the use of broad discretionary
powers by sentencing courts and correctional personnel. Unlike the
power of the minimal state, power exercised in the name of rehabilitation could be trusted to do good; benevolence had no limits. 3 For
the judiciary, long accustomed to benign neglect of prisons, the
rehabilitative ideal affirmed its hands-off attitude toward prison
practices.
The ideological hegemony of the rehabilitative ideal collapsed
during the 1970's. A "massive desertion from the rehabilitative ideal
and its assumptions" occurred in public, political, and academic

R.

or substantive justice requires that rules be interpreted in terms of ideals
that define the conception of justice.
UNGAR,

supra note 19, at 195.

27. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 103 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
28. 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).

29. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J. 17, 19 (1899).
30. See F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 6 (1981) ("[Ilt

is remarkable how widely the rehabilitative ideal was accepted in this century as a
statement of the aspirations for the penal system, a statement largely endorsed by
the media, politicians, and ordinary citizens.") A detailed examination of the rise
of the rehabilitative ideology is presented in F. CULLEN & G. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING
REHABILITATION 45-83 (1982).
31. Historian David Rothman attributes this trust in the state to the
Progressives'
belief that the state, not individual self-interest, could define the common good
and make the individual free from domination by the private sector. This trust in
the state finds expression in the extensive discretion given the juvenile court, one
of the many contributions of the Progressives to the modem criminal justice system.
Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the Progressive Era, in DOING

69-95 (1978).

GOOD

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

circles. 3" Two competing ideologies emerged from its rubble, each
attacking the rehabilitative ideal.
The first ideology, labeled as liberal, focuses on protection of
prisoners' rights." The liberal ideology rejected the rehabilitative ideal
when it redefined rehabilitation as treatment having the appearance
of benevolence but the substance of oppression. Proponents adopted
the belief that enforced therapy works an improper intrusion on the
prisoners' autonomy and provides a rationale for the exercise of
unchecked governmental power. As it addresses the administration
of the nation's prisons, contemporary liberal penal ideology relies on
three basic precepts: first, that prisons are at best necessary evils which
should incarcerate only those offenders too dangerous to remain in
the body politic; second, that the rights of inmates can be protected
only if the conduct of prison officials is carefully scrutinized by the
judiciary; and third, that inmates are entitled to the maximum degree
of liberty compatible with the security of the prison.
The second major assault on the rehabilitative ideal has been
labeled as conservative and emphasizes protecting society rather than
either rehabilitating the offender or safeguarding the criminal's civil
rights. 3 ' The conservative ideology perceives rehabilitation as
32. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in American Criminal Justice,
27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 149-50 (1978). Allen traces the decline of the rehabilitative
ideal to "cultural events" which undermined its legitimacy among the public and
its constituents. Among these events were: the perception of increasing crime; hostility
to authority arising from the civil rights movement, Vietnam war, and Watergate
affair; the increased social distance between the public and the prison population
brought about by the rising percentages of non-white inmates; and the equation of
criminal penalties with the oppression of Blacks. F. ALLEN, supra note 30, at 29-31;
see also Halleck & Witte, Is RehabilitationDead?, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 372 (1977);

Serrill, Is Rehabilitation Dead?, 1 CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE 21 (1975).
33. See F. CULLEN & G. GILBERT, supra note 30, at 104-25. The liberal penal
ideology finds its foremost expression in AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE,

JUSrICE (1971). Other influential expressions of the liberal penal ideology
.. WE ARE TE LIVING PROOF . . ." (2d ed. 1979); J. MITFoRD,
KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973); McAnany, Justice in Search of Fairness in
JUSTICE As FAIRNEss 22-51 (1981); Rothman, Of Prisons, Asylums, and Other Decaying Institutions, 26 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1972). See generally Bayer, Crime, Punishment, and the Decline of Liberal Optimism, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 169 (1981).
34. See F. CULLEN & G. GILBERT, supra note 30, at 91-104. Unlike the liberal
penal ideology, the conservative perspective did not benefit from any publication
as articulate and comprehensive as AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra
note 33. The tenor of the conservative penal ideology finds expression in E. VAN
DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (rev.
ed. 1983); see also Miller, Ideology and Criminal Justice Policy: Some Current Issues
in CLASSES, CONFLICT AND CONTROL 3-38 (J. Munro ed. 1976). The conservative penal
STRUGGLE FOR

include D.

FOGEL, ".
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accomplishing little more than the coddling of criminals. For conservatives, offenders are not sick and thus do not require rehabilitation; rather, they are rational actors who engage in crime because
lenient punishments fail to deter them. Regarding the administration

of prisons, contemporary conservative penal ideology advances two
propositions. First, prisons properly impose harsh, punitive conditions
of confinement because inmates should experience incarceration as
severe retribution. Accordingly, the body politic should not grant

inmates constitutional rights which ameliorate retribution. Second,
prison administrators, being best qualified to control the dangerous
felons who inhabit prisons, should be accorded extensive discretionary

powers.
Along with the decline of the rehabilitative ideology prisons
experienced a minor revolution as federal courts dramatically expanded
the number and scope of prisoners' rights." The lower federal courts
stood at the forefront of the judiciary's reform of the nation's jails
ideology draws heavily from the "Crime Control Model" of criminal justice in that
both are based on the belief that "the repression of criminal conduct is by far the
most important function to be performed by the criminal process." H. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 158 (1968). What this article describes as the conservative penal ideology can be seen as the application of Packer's Crime Control
Model to the administration of prisons. In turn, those critics of the rehabilitative
model, whom Gordon Hawkins calls "rigorists," embody the values of conservative
penal ideology:
The term "rigor" denotes severity and strictness, and in speaking of rigorism
I refer to the belief that severe treatment and strict discipline should be
the basic elements of strict prison programs. Critics who adopt this viewpoint are not usually overly concerned about human rights or humanitarian
values. Their dissatisfaction with the correctional treatment model stems from
a different ideological basis. For them, that model is misconceived not
because it involves some lack of respect for individual rights but because
it is seen as representing a misguided and sentimental departure from older
and sounder punitive principles.
G. HAWKINS, THE PRISON 12 (1976).
35. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977) (habilitative environment); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
932 (1978) (search and seizure); Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973)
(access to the courts); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973) (protection from inmate violence); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969) (freedom
of religion); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) (racial discrimination); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (corporal punishment);
Hamilton v. Covington, 445 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Ark. 1978) (protection from fire
hazards); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (habilitative environment), aff'd as modified sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978);
Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (procedural due process
in administrative segregation decisions), aff'd mem., 434 U.S. 1052 (1978); Carter
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and prisons.36 Hardly any aspect of prisoner life was considered to

be beyond the ken of these courts during the 1970's. For a time,

the Supreme Court accepted the views of the lower federal courts:
during the 1970's the Court upheld lower federal court rulings giving

inmates limited rights of expression, 3" association,38 and access to the
courts,39 and to medical care"' and procedural due process in parole
revocation," and prison disciplinary actions. However, in recent years,
this trend has been reversed as the Court has attempted to erect a

new hands-off doctrine through a policy of broad deference to the
conduct of correctional officials. 3
One result of this lower federal court activism was the development of a legal theory by which the right to habilitative prison con-

ditions was anchored in the Constitution. Since Pugh v. Locke,"

v. McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (procedural due process in
disciplinary decisions); Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970) (medical
care), aff'd, 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1971).
36. The efforts of the lower federal courts to reform prison conditions have
been described and analyzed by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Fair, supra note
3; Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of
Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under
the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893 (1977); Note, Eighth Amendment
Challenges to Conditions of Confinement: State Prison Reform by Judicial Decree,
18 WASHBURN L.J. 288 (1979); Comment, supra note 3.
37. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
38. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
39. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
40. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
41. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
42. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Baxter v. Palmigian, 425 U.S.
308 (1976).
43. See Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S.Ct. 864 (1983); Jago v. Van Curen, 454
U.S.
14 (1981); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 137 (1977); Montanye
v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); see also
Berger, supra note 1; Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the ConstitutionalRights
of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CoNT. L.Q. 219 (1977); Robbins, supra
note 5; Robertson, The Constitutional Rights of an Inmate at an Administrative
Segregation Proceedings: Hewitt v. Helms and the Withdrawal of Prisoners'Rights,
11 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 57 (1984). The extent that recent Court decisions have actually
restrained the lower federal courts remains largely unexplored. See Robertson, When
the Supreme Court Commands, Do the Lower Federal Courts Obey? The Impact
of Rhodes v. Chapman on CorrectionalLitigation, 7 HAMLNE L. REV. 79 (1984)
(The impact of Supreme Court decisions on the lower federal courts is lessened by
divisions within the Court, a vague majority opinion, and policy preferences of lower'
federal court judges that are at odds with those of the Court.).
44. 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd as modified sub nom. Newman
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several federal courts have accepted the theory that inmates are entitled
to habilitative conditions under the eighth amendment.4 ' The basis

for this theory can best be expressed as a syllogism. The major premise
asserts the Supreme Court's identification of cruel and unusual punish-

ment as the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'" and its
demand that punishment serve a legitimate penal goal.4 7 The minor
premise posits that confinement under conditions "where degeneration is probable and self-improvement unlikely ' 48 increases the
probability of an inmate's recidivating and eventually suffering

additional punishment in the form of future incarceration. From the
major and minor premises, one may conclude that inmates are pro-

tected under the cruel and unusual punishment clause from prison
conditions making degeneration probable and self-improvement unlikely

because allowing such debilitative conditions amounts to an unnecessary
infliction of suffering which serves no legitimate penal goal. As one
court put it, "[p]unishment for one crime, under conditions which
spawn future crimes and more punishment, serves no valid legislative
purpose and is so totally without penological justification that it results
in the gratuitous infliction of suffering in violation of the Eighth
49
Amendment."

v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978):
While courts have thus far declined to elevate a positive rehabilitation program to the level of a constitutional right, it is clear that a penal system
cannot be operated in such a manner that it impedes an inmate's ability
to attempt rehabilitation, or simply avoid physical, mental or social
deterioration.
406 F. Supp. at 330.
45. See, e.g., Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1981); Battle
v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 403 (10th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Lane, 548 F. Supp.
927, 931 (N.D. I11. 1982); Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435, 525 (N.D. Ind.
1981); Heitman v. Gabriel, 524 F. Supp. 622, 627 n.4 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Ramos
v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 131-32 (D. Colo. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated in part,
and remanded, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1980); Laaman
v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 324-25 (D.N.H. 1977); Barnes v. Virgin Islands,
415 F. Supp. 1218 (D.V.I. 1976).
46. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
47. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (A punishment is
cruel and unusual if it "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) ("[The sanction imposed
cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous
infliction of suffering.").
48. Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. at 316.
49. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
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Habilitation is an expansive right, covering all aspects of confinement. The totality of prison conditions acquire constitutional
significance: unconstitutionality is measured by aggregating the effects
of confinement. 0 The prison is perceived as an microcosm, in which
the diverse realms of an inmate's life are joined together under the
concept of his or her habilitative welfare.
The right to habilitative prison conditions requires that prisons
do more than merely abstain from certain actions. Affirmative obligations are acquired and the extent of these obligations has been variously
articulated. For example, Pugh v. Locke" mandated minimum constitutional standards in the following areas: (1) living space; (2) segregation and isolation areas; (3) classification; (4) mental health care; (5)
protection from violence; (6) living conditions; (7) food service; (8)
correspondence and visitation; (9) educational, vocational, and employment opportunities; (10) physical plant facilities; and (11) staff ratios
3
and training.5 2 In contrast, Laaman v. Helgemoe' employed two
interacting variables: (1) the probability of degeneration; and (2) an
accommodation among the rehabilitative, deterrent, and security functions of the institution in question." With regard to the latter variable,
no single goal, such as security alone, would justify degenerative prison
conditions. Instead, the institution must strike a balance among the
three functions. Once the probability of degeneration is determined
by examining the totality of prison conditions, remedial action is to
be considered against the backdrop of the rehabilitative, deterrent,
5
and security functions of the penitentiary.
50. The totality approach permits a finding of cruel and unusual punishment
through an assessment of the aggregate impact of various prison conditions even
though no one condition itself violates the eighth amendment. All conditions that
contribute to the finding become subject to judicial remedy. Consequently, the totality
approach allows courts to impose comprehensive reforms upon federal and state
prisons. See, e.g., Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1981); Laaman
v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322-23 (D.N.H. 1977); see also Robbins & Buser,
supra note 36, at 920.
51. 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd as modified sub noma. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
52. Id. at 332-35. Illustrative of the detailed requirements of these constitutional minimums are: 1)that single occupancy isolation cells have at least 60 square
feet of living space; 2) that all inmates be provided a storage locker and lock; and
3) that there must be either one urinal or one foot or urinal trough for every 15
prisoners.
53. Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977).
54. Id. at 316-17.
55. Id.
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The affirmative obligations imposed upon the prison in order to
foster habilitation dramatically redefine the boundaries of cruel and
unusual punishment. Manifest and intentional inflictions of harm are
no longer requisite features of unconstitutional punishment. Protection against degeneration requires the definition of punishment to
include the unintended and latent harms inflicted by the prison as
a "total institution." 56 In the prison power works not only upon the
"body" but also at the "capillary" level, identified as "the point
where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, attitudes, their
discourses, learning processes and everyday lives." 5 7 Consequently,
penal deprivations that once passed constitutional muster become
suspect. For example, in Laaman v. Helgemoe,5" the court concluded
that the New Hampshire State Prison violated the habilitation standard.
even though it found inmates to be "adequately warehoused."" The
court reasoned that the aggregate impact of "inadequate" or
"insufficient" food service, isolation cells, fire protection, medical
services, educational and vocational programs, and classification system
"costs a man more than part of his life; it robs him of his skills,
his ability to cope with society in a civilized manner, and, most
importantly, his essential human dignity." ' 6 One commentator placed
this decision at the "forefront of constitutional reform" because of
its extension of the eighth amendment to non-shocking prison

conditions

61

The Supreme Court did not address the constitutional status of
habilitative prison conditions until its decision in Rhodes v. Chapman.62
Rhodes demonstrated that a majority of the Court did not accept
the ideological position which the lower federal courts embraced when
formulating their concept of an eighth amendment right to habilitation. It is to this subject that this article next turns.
IV.

RHODES v. CHAPMAN:

A

REFLECTION OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT

The introduction of purposive legal reasoning into adjudication
of eighth amendment issues has permitted the judicial selection of
56. A total institution is "a place of residence and work where a large number
of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period
of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life." E. GoFFMAN,
ASYLUMS xiii (1961).
57. M. FOUCAOLT, supra note 15, at 39.
58. 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977).

59. Id. at 306.

60. Id. at 325.
61. Note, supra note 7, at 256-57.
62. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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ideological values under the aegis of defining cruel and unusual punishment. However, according to Professor Roberto Ungar, "[as] purposive
legal reasoning and concerns with substantive justice begin to prevail,
the style of legal discourse approaches that of commonplace political
or economic argument." 3 Upon collapse of the rehabilitative consensus, a scramble to fill the void left in the ideological environment
surrounding prisoner law suits between the conservative and liberal
penal ideologies ensued. The resulting clash found expression in the
contrasting views about the nature and function of imprisonment ex,
pressed by members of the Supreme Court in Rhodes v. Chapman."
At issue before the Court in Rhodes was the constitutionality
of double-celling inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
The trial court"5 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit" both held that double-celling at the facility inflicted cruel
and unusal punishment. The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, concluded that double-celling at the prison
'
did not impose "conditions intolerable for prison confinement." 67
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, concurred. 68
Only Justice Marshall dissented. 69
Despite their nearly unanimous agreement that conditions at the
Ohio prison did not impose cruel and unusual punishment, the five
Justices supporting the majority opinion and three in concurrence
differed over the proper function of the penitentiary. Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens accepted habilitation as a constitutional right;
and while Justice Powell's majority opinion did not explicitly reject
this position, it did embrace ideological tenets incompatible with
grounding habilitation in the Constitution.
63. R. UNGAR, supra note 19, at 199.
64. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). For other analyses of Rhodes, see Note, Prison Overcrowding and Rhodes v. Chapman; Double-ceiling by What Standard?, 23 B.C.L.
REV. 713 (1982); Note, Constitutional Law-"Double Ceiling," Under All
Circumstances, Held Not Violative of Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 12 CuM. L. REV. 728 (1982); Comment, Prison Overcrowding as Cruel
and Unusual Punishment: Rhodes v. Chapman, 66 MINN. L. REV. 1215 (1982).
65. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd, 624 F.2d
1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 337, (1981).
66. Chapman v. Rhodes, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 337
(1981).
67. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981).
68. Id. at 352-58 (Brennan, J., concurring). In addition to joining Justice
Brennan's concurrence, Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence. Id. at 368-69
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 369-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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A.

THE CONCURRING OPINION

Justice Brennan viewed habilitative prison conditions as a right
guaranteed by the eighth amendment: "When 'the cumulative impact
of the conditions of incarceration threatens the physical, mental, and
emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creates a
probability of recidivism and future incarceration,' the court must
conclude that the conditions violate the Constitution." ' 7° His attitude
toward the habilitative function of incarceration outlined a constitutional theory in accord with the basic tenets of the liberal penal
ideology, as can be seen through an analysis of those tenets.
1.

The Degenerative Nature of Imprisonment

The first precept of the liberal penal ideology is that imprisonment results in the degeneration of inmates. As one leading liberal
critic of rehabilitation writes, "[p]risons brutalize inmates, humiliate
them, and educate them in the ways of crime."" While the liberal
penology does not advocate abolition of prisons, it does condemn
the evils wrought upon the offender by imprisonment and would
counter them by making prisons no more punitive than demanded
by the need for security and internal order. Rather than emphasizing
direct government intervention to achieve this goal, supporters of the
liberal ideology would empower inmates with the constitutional rights
necessary to redress the degenerative nature of imprisonment.
Justice Brennan's acceptance of habilitation as a right granted
inmates via the eighth amendment represents the translation of this
first precept into constitutional expression. Mirroring liberal penal
ideology's condemnation of the degenerative aspects of imprisonment,
Brennan concludes that cruel and unusual punishment is imposed when
conditions of confinement endanger "the physical, mental, and
emotional health and well-being of the inmates." 2 For Justice Brennan,
degeneration is not merely to be condemned; he supports the view
70. Id. at 364 (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H.

1977)).
71. See Rothman, supra note 33, at 13; see also AMERICAN
COMMITTEE,

FRIENDS SERVICE

supra note 33, at 33:

We submit that the basic evils of imprisonment are that it denies autonomy,
degrades dignity, impairs or destroys self-reliance, inculcates authoritarian
values, minimizes the likelihood of beneficial interaction with one's peers,
fractures family ties, destroys the family's economic stability, and prejudices

the prisoner's future prospects for any improvement in his economic and

social status.

72. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Laaman v.
Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)).
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that inmates should be given a positive constitutional basis upon which
to protect themselves rather than relying on the benevolence of prison
administrators.
2.

Distrust of Discretionary Power

The liberal penal ideology perceives the discretionary power of
prison officials as being readily abused.73 To support this second
precept, advocates of the liberal penal ideology look to the destructive effects of the hands-off doctrine upon prison conditions: the
unchecked powers of prison officials have resulted in administrative
lawlessness, with officials exercising their powers in arbitrary ways.7 4
Consequently, judicial oversight of prison officials is vital if their conduct is to be expected to comport with fundamental fairness. A return
to the hands-off doctrine would subject inmates to the abuses spawned
by absolute power.
Similarly, Justice Brennan's concurrence reflects a distrust of
discretionary powers long used and abused by prison officials. He
noted that by 1981 conditions in individual prisons or entire penal
systems in nearly half the states had been found unconstitutional, 5
and that legislators and prison administrators, who were "entrusted
in the first instance" with the operation of prisons, were to blame. 6
Like the liberal critics, Justice Brennan viewed judicial intervention
as both necessary and beneficial: "[Tihe courts have emerged as a
critical force behind efforts to ameliorate inhumane conditions [in
prisons]. Insulated as they are from political pressures, and charged
with the duty of enforcing the Constitution, courts are in the strongest
73. The perception that prison officials had been corrupted by their vast powers
is vividly presented in Greenberg & Stender, supra note 2.
74. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (whipping of
prisoners); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (solitary confinement
of a naked prisoner in unsanitary conditions); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362
(E.D. Ark. 1970) (gross overcrowding, pervasive filth, and rampant violence), aff'd,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). Egregious prison conditions have not disappeared from
the nation's prisons. See, e.g., Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Ind.
1981) (inmates suffered "genuine privations and hardships," id. at 524); Ruiz v.
Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (staff brutality, failure to protect inmates
from assaultive prisoners, overcrowding, and numerous other conditions resulting
in cruel and unusual punishment), modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir.), modified, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th
Cir. 1982); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (failure to provide
adequate access to the courts).
75. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353 (Brennan, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 354.
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position to insist that unconstitutional conditions be remedied, even
at significant financial cost." 7
3.

Maximizing the Liberty of Inmates

The third of the interrelated precepts of the liberal penal ideology
provides that inmates should have the maximum amount of liberty
compatible with the security of the prison. As liberal penologist David
Fogel states, "[a]ll the rights accorded free citizens consistent with
mass living and the execution of a sentence restricting the freedom
8 Legal scholars
of movement should follow a prisoner into prison."
7 9
refer to this precept as the "least restrictive means doctrine." Since
liberal penologists distrust governmental paternalism, they believe that
inmates are best protected when they retain their fundamental civil
rights. Imprisonment is in and of itself sufficient punishment.
Justice Brennan's acceptance of habilitative prison conditions as
a requirement of the eighth amendment indirectly embraces this final
precept of contemporary liberal penology. The concept of habilitation is premised on the belief that people are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment. Separation from society is punishment
enough; in order to preserve the surviving liberty interest inmates must
be protected from further harm in the form of degenerative prison
conditions. By espousing habilitation as a prisoner's right, Justice
Brennan envisions an eighth amendment which prevents unnecessary
acts of intrusion into an inmate's liberty interest.

B.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

While Justice Brennan's acceptance of the right to habilitative
prison conditions reflects the influence of the liberal penal ideology
77. Id. at 359. Elsewhere in Rhodes Justice Brennan observes that "the lower
courts have learned from repeated investigation and bitter experience that judicial
intervention is indispensableif constitutional dictates-not to mention considerations
of basic humanity-are to be observed in the prisons." Id. at 354.
78. D. FOGEL, supra note 33, at 202 (emphasis deleted).
79. The doctrine of least restrictive alternative requires government to achieve
a desired end in a manner that does not unnecessarily intrude on constitutionally
protected rights. See Singer, Sending Men to Prison: ConstitutionalAspects of the
Burden of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to
Sentencing Determinations, 58

CORNELL

L. REV. 51, 55-59 (1972). For a history of

the doctrine, see Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis
and the Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 375,
385-91 (1981). See also Note, The Least Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional
Adjudication: An Analysis, a Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV.
971 (1974).

80. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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on the Supreme Court, the values embodied in this ideology are not
subscribed to by a majority of the Court. Justice Powell's majority
opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman rejects the constitutional basis for
habilitation, favoring instead the conservative ideological tenets. A
review of these tenets illustrates his acceptance of the more conservative
point of view.
1.

PrisonsShould Be Experienced as Harsh, ForebodingInstitutions

The conservative penal ideology seeks to legitimate the prison
as a punitive institution."I From this perspective, the rehabilitative
ideal is flawed because it denies society an opportunity to impose
retribution upon offenders. Furthermore, supporters of the conservative ideology believe that harsh prison conditions will serve to deter
offenders, who are rational actors weighing the pains and pleasures
to be gained from criminal enterprise. According to the late J. Edgar
Hoover, the criminal fears " 'certain, unrelenting punishment.' " He
continued:
"That is what he understands, and nothing else, and that fear is
the only thing which will force him into the ranks of the law-abiding.
There is no royal road to law enforcement. If we wait upon the
medical quacks, the parole panderers, and the misguided sympathizers
with habitual criminals to protect our lives and property from the
criminal horde, then we must also resign ourselves to increasing
violence, robbery, and sudden death." 82
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Rhodes incorporates this
perspective. He interpreted the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment as requiring only "the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities" 3 within the prison, a standard that falls
considerably short of mandating habilitative prison conditions. Furthermore, Justice Powell defined "life's necessities" with reference only
to the physical welfare of inmates, excluding consideration of their
mental, emotional, and social well-being." Conditions that are "restric81. See G. HAWKINS, supra note 34, at 12-16 ("The rigorists advocate a sternly
repressive, vigorously disciplined, punitive regimen for the prisons." Id. at 12.).
82. Address by J. Edgar Hoover, Daughters of the American Revolution Annual
Convention (April 23, 1936), quoted in E. SUTHLERLAND & D. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINOLOGY 361 (10th ed. 1978).
83. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

84. In assessing the impact of overcrowding on inmates, Justice Powell appears
to have been exclusively concerned with finding concrete evidence of immediate,
physical harm. Unlike Justice Brennan's concurrence, the majority opinion fails to
consider the long-term, latent impacts of overcrowding on the mental and emotional
health of inmates. Compare id. at 347-48 with id. at 361-64 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tive" and "harsh" become simply part of the penalty to be paid by
offenders.85 Finally, Justice Powell's opinion expanded the range of
legitimate incarceral goals to include "punish[ing] justly," an apparent
euphemism for retribution."6
2.

Prison Officials Should Have Extensive Discretionary Powers

The conservative penal ideology is little concerned with the rights
of inmates.8 7 Instead, it focuses on the "right" of society to punish
offenders. Consequently, prisons should be houses of discipline and
prison authorities should be severe disciplinarians: only then will
retribution and deterrence be realized. To accomplish this task, prison
administrators require extensive discretionary powers. Judicial
"interference" unwittingly serves to counteract retribution and deterrence because it permits prisoners to use litigation to sap the
disciplinary powers of the prison staff.
Justice Powell's opinion in Rhodes articulates the conservative
tenet that prison officials should be allowed to operate their prisons
largely unhindered by the courts. He wrote that "[t]his Court must
proceed cautiously,"8 8 that the Court's ruling must not be based on
"'a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility,' ''89 and
that "courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the
penal function in the criminal justice system." 9 While Justice Powell
did not preclude judicial intervention under any specific circumstance, 9
the tenor of his opinion suggests that the judiciary's intervention in
prison matters has been too extensive. In his view, the time for judicial
retreat from expanding prisoners' rights has arrived, and he would
be its harbinger. 9 2
85. Id. at 347.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 352.

See G.

HAWKINS,

supra note 34, at 12.

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351.
Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)).

90. Id. at 352.

91. Id. "Courts certainly have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of the cruel
and unusual confinement .... When conditions of confinement amount to cruel and
unusual punishment, 'federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional
rights.' " (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974)).
92. See Aronson, Prisoners' Rights, 1982 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 79, 83 (1982)

("The majority's call [in Rhodes] for greater deference may be seen as removing
the threat that certain prison conditions will be declared unconstitutional. .... ");

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

V.

DISCUSSION

This analysis of prisoners' rights adjudication reveals the close
relationship between judicial decision-making and the ideological structure of contemporary penology. One does not see the operation of
autonomous legal norms; the substantive content of the eighth amendment arises from the interrelationship between the legal and social
systems. The courts, located at the nexus between law and the broader
society, acquire important policy-making powers.
The conflict between the liberal and conservative ideologies has
found expression in judicial interpretations of the eighth amendment.
Constitutional theories in support of each of these ideologies have
developed and have been integrated into a hierarchical judicial system
that vests in the Supreme Court ultimate jurisdiction to constitutionally
resolve the underlying normative conflict. Whereas the majority opinion
in Rhodes v. Chapman did not explicitly repudiate the habilitative
standard, it did embrace incongruent values. Rhodes also indicates
that a new consensus is in the making, one which emphasizes the
retributive function of incarceration and re-establishes the limited role
of the courts in overseeing prison administration.
As an arena for normative conflict over the function of the
penitentiary, and as an instrument for integrating this conflict into
existing legal framework, judicial interpretation of the eighth amendment appears to operate within what has been termed a "paradigm
of conflict functionalism" by sociologist Lewis Coser. 9" This paradigm
views society as having a consensual basis that is periodically weakened
by conflict over the distribution of scarce resources. Coser asserts that
the less rigid the social system, the more capable it is of revitalizing

Eighth Amendment-A Significant Limit on Federal Court Activism in Ameliorating
State Prison Conditions, 72 J. CaiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1345, 1346 (1981) (I[Wlith
Rhodes, the Court effectively undermined federal court leadership in pressing for
improvements in state prisons across the country.").
93. L. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956). Coser believes that
conflict plays a critical role in maintaining group cohesion. Consequently, he stands
apart from most conflict theorists, who define conflict as a source of social change.
Coser identifies two forms of conflict, external conflict and internal conflict. External
conflict, such as a war between nation-states, makes individuals acutely aware of
their national identity by introducing a negative reference group, the enemy nationstate. Id. at 33-38. Internal conflict, which is addressed in this article, occurs within
a society or an institution. Coser asserts that the cohesion of a society or an institution can be revitalized by internal conflict. See id. at 39. For a detailed critique
of Coser's paradigm, see J. TURNER, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIALoGICAL THEORY 159-78
(1978).
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existing norms or creating new ones to accommodate conflict and to
promote a new consensus. Consistent with Coser's model, the
normative basis of American penology has been dominated, by the
rehabilitative ideal. The consensus over rehabilitation, however, did
not obscure its two functions, one manifest, the other latent: the
manifest function embraced the rhetoric of the rehabilitative ideal
whereas the latent function promoted an orderly prison and retributive
prison conditions. 94 When liberals and conservatives were no longer
able to reconcile the manifest and latent functions of rehabilitation,
they redefined the rehabilitative ideal as the noble lie. Consequently,
the consensus, made possible by agreement over and acceptance of
both the manifest and latent functions of rehabilitation, collapsed.
Conflict over the function of the penitentiary, once resolved through
these dual functions of the rehabilitative ideal, has entered the legal
arena for resolution because the open-ended, flexible nature of modern
eighth amendment interpretation readily allows for the translation of
ideological conflict into varying views as to the function of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause.
Controversy surrounds Coser's paradigm of conflict functionalism
due largely to the fact that he fails to identify for whom the "conflict" is "functional." While Coser portrays a system that seeks
harmony, radical criminologists describe a criminal justice system
dominated by a ruling elite." From their perspective, the expansion
of prisoners' rights is functional to the degree it promotes the perception that the judiciary and the other instruments of class domination,
one of which is the prison, are legitimate institutions of social control. However, this article does not seek to resolve the controversy
regarding conflict functionalism, but rather intends only to suggest
that the emergence and retrenchment of, if not retreat from, the
expansion of prisoners' rights involves an ideological conflict which
was introduced to the legal system through the interface of law and
society.
94. See D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE 10 (1980) ("In the end,
when conscience and convenience met, convenience won. When treatment and coercion
met, coercion won."); D. ROTHMAN, Thn DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 240 (1971) ("The
promise of reform had built up the asylums; the functionalism of custody perpetrated
them.").
95. See, e.g., B. KIUSBERO, CRIME AND PvnmoE: TOWARD ANEW CRIMINOLOGY
(1975); CRrrIcAL CRIMINOLOGY (I. Taylor, P. Walton & J. Young eds. 1975); Platt,
Prospects for a Radical Criminology in the United States, 1 CRIME & SOc. JUST.
2 (1974); Quinney, The Production of a Marxist Criminology 2 CONTEMPT. CRISEs
277 (1978).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Courts do not function in an ideological vacuum; they connect
law and society by interweaving normative discourse with legal rules
and principles. Ultimately, judicial interpretations of the Constitution
involve factual assessments filtered through political, social, and moral
precepts of society.9 6 Just as the ideology of laissez-faire influenced
the Supreme Court between 1890 and 1923," so have penal ideologies
shaped the adjudication of prisoners' rights. The constitutional right
to habilitative prison conditions identified in the lower federal courts
mirrors the principles of liberal penal ideology and demonstrates the
influence of this ideology on the prisoners' rights revolution of the
1970's. However, during the 1980's, the influence of conservative penal
ideology has been strongly felt in correction litigation as judges are
asked to select among controverted conceptions of incarceral punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman evidences the clash of these two ideologies
in the judicial forum and the dominant influence of the conservative
penal ideology within the Supreme Court.9"
96. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921) ("The
great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their
course, and pass the judges by."); Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional
Law, in ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 89 (R. McCloskey ed. 1957) ("Judges have
preferences for social policies, as you and I. . . .They are warmed by the same
winter and summer and by the same ideas as a layman is.").
97. See,. e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner
v. New York,,198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); see
also G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 165-66 (1976).

98. The Court's decision in Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983), demonstrates
that the ideological division over prisoners' rights in Rhodes is not an anomaly. Hewitt
addressed two questions: first, when, if at all, does the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment apply to the removal of inmates from the general prison
population to administrative segregation?; and second, if due process is applicable,
how much process is due segregated inmates? Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
applied a narrow definition of the reach of due process within the prison, holding
that administratively segregated inmates must look to a state-created liberty interest
to trigger due process safeguards. Id. at 870-71. As to the process due segregated
inmates, Justice Rehnquist outlined procedures providing few meaningful safeguards
against arbitrary decisions to remove inmates to segregated quarters for administrative
reasons. Id. at 874. The probable effect of Hewitt is to give prison officials extensive discretionary powers in determining when the security of the prison or the safety
of inmates requires the segregation of prisoners. Four Justices dissented: Justice
Marshall, who also dissented in Rhodes; Justices Stevens and Blackmun, who joined
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Rhodes; and Justice Brennan.
Generally, the Hewitt majority and dissenting opinions reflected the tenor of
the conservative and liberal penal ideologies respectively. Justice Rehnquist, speaking
for the majority, emphasized that conviction essentially extinguished the liberty interest
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of inmates. In contrast, Justice Stevens, author of the dissenting opinion, spoke of
a broad liberty interest that survived conviction. Id. at 877-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
While Justice Rehnquist expressed deference to the conduct of prison officials, Justice
Stevens sought to safeguard inmates against abusive uses of state power. In weighing
the competing merits of institutional authority and prisoners' rights, the majority
and dissenting opinions employed contrasting ideological standards.

